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The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Best Response to 
Booker Is to Do Nothing
MIChael 
ToNRy*
professor of  law 
and public policy, 
university of  
Minnesota
Feedback the Commission has received suggests that dis-
trict court judges generally view the appeals process as 
functioning well. . . . District court judges generally con-
sider proper the discretion afforded to them under the 
Booker standard of review. Indeed, 75 percent of federal 
district judges believe that the current advisory guidelines 
system best achieves the purposes of sentencing.
In fiscal year 2010, the courts imposed sentences within the 
applicable advisory guideline range or below the range at 
the request of the government in 80.4 percent of all cases: 
55.0 percent of all cases were sentenced within the appli-
cable guideline range, 25.4 percent received a 
government-sponsored below-range sentence. In fiscal year 
2010, the non-government-sponsored below-range rate was 
17.8 percent, and the rate of sentences imposed above the 
guidelines range was 1.8 percent.
—Judge Patti B. Saris1
The tale is told by the two passages from Judge Patti B. 
Saris’s testimony to a House Judiciary Subcommittee that 
appear as epigraphs. Despite its tortured history, the federal 
sentencing system in its post-Booker advisory form is about 
as sensible, workable, and just as it is likely to be in our time. 
Eighty percent of sentences fall within the applicable guide-
lines or below them with government approval. That 
measure—“within . . . or below with government 
approval”—though odd at first blush, makes sense. It means 
that the vast majority of sentences are imposed within the 
applicable guideline ranges or, if lower, reflect agreements 
between the prosecutors and sentencing judges directly 
involved that some lesser punishment is appropriate.
Having 80 percent of sentences be consonant with 
guidelines is pretty good; it’s comparable to the most 
admired state systems. Higher consonancy levels in a 
country that spans a continent of culturally and politically 
diverse states is unachievable without recreating a system 
of arbitrarily unjust—and therefore often disingenuously 
and inconsistently circumvented—sentencing like the fed-
eral guidelines in the 1990s. Most district court judges 
believe the system is working well; 75 percent believe “that 
the current advisory guidelines system best achieves the 
purposes of sentencing.”2 They are the people who are 
most likely to know.
Judge Saris made three major proposals in her testi-
mony. The first—that a more robust appellate review 
standard be created that includes a presumption of reason-
ableness for sentences falling within guideline ranges—is 
unnecessary. There is no evidence that the current system 
is working badly relative to any real-world measure of 
what a federal sentencing system can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish. Judge Saris noted in her testi-
mony that “some appeals court judges view the appeals 
process as broken” and devoted four pages to a summary 
of their complaints.3 Discontent among court of appeals 
judges, however, is not evidence that the current system is 
inadequate; it shows only that some liked to micro-man-
age the decisions of trial judges under the pre-Booker 
regime and are frustrated that they can no longer do so.
The second—clarification of arguable inconsistencies 
between § 994 of Title 28, which sets out commission 
responsibilities, and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which directs sen-
tencing judges to consider offender characteristics—is 
dangerous. It would risk reducing judicial authority to 
individualize sentences in ways most line prosecutors, 
sentencing judges, and defense counsel believe is just 
and appropriate.4
The third—codifying the “three-step process”—is also 
dangerous. It would require judges first to calculate the 
formally applicable guideline range, then to consider 
whether under the Commission’s highly restrictive criteria 
concerning offender characteristics a departure is called 
for, and only then to consider whether a “variance” is 
appropriate to tailor the sentence to the characteristics of 
the offense and the circumstances of the offender. That is 
dangerous because it would unduly restrict judges’ dis-
cretion to impose situationally just and appropriate 
sentences. Details of individual cases vary enormously, as 
do prevailing cultural and social norms in different parts 
of the country. Ignoring either set of differences invites 
injustice and circumvention.
Other people have given detailed accounts of their 
views on the three recommendations, so I see no value in 
elaborating on mine here. Instead, in three steps I 
explain why the current federal sentencing system for all 
its imperfections is about as good as is obtainable. First, 
I offer a few salient reminders about the history of the 
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federal guidelines. Second, I explain why— architectur-
ally—Booker inadvertently produced a federal sentencing 
system at least as well designed as any other imaginable 
one to make gross injustices less likely than before 
Booker. (At judges’ hands, that is; Congress and the Com-
mission in general and individual federal prosecutors in 
particular cases bear responsibility for unconscionably 
lengthy mandatory minimum and recommended guideline 
sentences.) Third, I explain why the existing 80 percent 
consonance rate is about as high as can be expected.
I. The history
The early U.S. Sentencing Commission during Judge 
William Wilkins’s chairmanship was a rogue agency, 
aspiring to be “a junior varsity Congress,” as Justice Sca-
lia put it in Mistretta.5 Judge Marvin Frankel’s original 
proposal was for creation of a specialized rule-making 
agency intended to insulate the sentencing system from 
public emotion and political influence.6 Instead, the ini-
tial Commission was highly sensitive to political 
ramifications of its decisions and overly deferential to 
Congress.7 The U.S. Supreme Court in Kimbrough8 even-
tually admonished the Commission for abandoning its 
independent specialist role during its formative years. 
The Court authorized sentencing judges to reject guide-
line sentences “because [in Judge Saris’s words] of a 
policy disagreement with the underlying rationale for the 
guideline. The Court suggests this ‘policy disagreement’ 
analysis is appropriate because guidelines that result 
from congressional directive, particularly specific direc-
tives, ‘do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its 
characteristic institutional role.’”9 As a result of its politi-
cal sensitivity and subservience, the early Commission 
adopted guidelines antithetical to the modest and gradu-
alist reforms Frankel proposed. Instead it created much 
more detailed and tougher sentencing policies than had 
previously existed in the federal courts, in any state, or in 
any guidelines system.
Along the way, the Commission (1) ignored statutory 
language in 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) calling for a presumption 
against imprisonment for most first offenders; (2) ignored 
statutory language in 28 U.S.C. 994(g) directing that any 
guidelines “minimize the likelihood that the Federal prison 
population will exceed the capacity of the Federal prisons”; 
(3) attempted to nullify 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which directed 
judges to take account of offender circumstances and statu-
tory sentencing purposes; (4) declared that many important 
defendant characteristics such as drug dependence, family 
responsibilities, employment records, and disadvantaged 
childhoods are “not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a departure is warranted”; (5) radically reduced use 
of community penalties except as part of a split sentence 
involving prison time; (6) attempted effectively to rewrite 
the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act by referring to the pre-
sumptive guideline system it authorized as “mandatory” 
guidelines; and (7) ignored the by-then-extensive state 
experience with successful guidelines.
The first five points are self-evident and have been 
widely acknowledged for a quarter century.10 The last two 
may benefit from explanation.
a. “Mandatory” Federal Guidelines
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was a successor to a 
continuous series of Senate bills, beginning with S.B. 181, 
introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy in 1974, all of 
which called for establishment of presumptive sentencing 
guidelines. So did the ’84 Act, as any plain reading of its 
text reveals. As was true of each presumptive state guide-
lines statute that preceded it, the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984 established a commission, charged it to develop 
guidelines, and authorized a system of appellate review of 
sentences that departed from the guidelines. The conven-
tional language then in use distinguished between 
“voluntary” (or advisory) guidelines and presumptive 
guidelines. “Mandatory guidelines,” an oxymoron, was not 
a term of art in the early 1980s and, so far as I know, did 
not become one until the Commission coined it. Many 
states experimented with voluntary guidelines in the 
1970s, and by the mid-’80s a near-consensus view 
emerged that presumptive guidelines, backed up by appel-
late sentence review, were the more effective means to 
reduce sentencing disparities.11
The 1984 Act does not mention “mandatory guide-
lines.” No such system existed (and none has since been 
created except in a loose sense in cells of North Carolina’s 
guidelines that specify prison sentences; those guidelines 
are literally mandatory in the fundamental sense that any 
sentence not authorized in those cells is unlawful). “Man-
datory” then as now in relation to sentencing always refers 
to laws in which legislation directs the judge to impose at 
least a specified sentence on every person convicted of a 
particular offense. That was never the legal status of the 
federal guidelines.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, Commis-
sion members, publications, and staff began to refer to the 
guidelines as mandatory. This they never were, as statu-
tory provisions on sentence appeals and the Commission’s 
rules on approved and disapproved bases for departures 
make clear. A sentencing law is by definition not manda-
tory if judges are given statutory authority to impose some 
other sentence. Use of that term, however, may have rei-
fied the statutorily presumptive guidelines system in the 
minds of Commission members and appellate judges into 
something they were not—mandatory.
B. State experience
By 1985, when the federal Commission began its work, 
there were fifteen years of experience with state guidelines. 
Voluntary guidelines had been attempted in many states in 
the 1970s and early ’80s; evaluations of their effects on 
reducing disparities were discouraging. Presumptive 
guidelines in Minnesota, however, had been convincingly 
shown to reduce unwarranted disparities, especially in rela-
tion to race and ethnicity, and to make correctional 
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populations predictable, which greatly aided rational plan-
ning by corrections departments and legislatures. By the 
mid-1980s, analyses of presumptive guidelines in Wash-
ington and Oregon reached the same conclusions.12
Through trial and error, states had learned what does 
and does not work. The U.S. Sentencing Commission 
ignored that learning. Lots of examples could be given, 
starting with the “relevant conduct” rule that called for 
sentencing judges to take account of uncharged and 
acquitted alleged crimes (every state commission before 
and after rejected that idea out of hand). Here are three 
especially important additional examples. First is the prob-
lem of what came to be known as the “sentencing 
machine.”13 Washington State’s commission for a time 
considered adopting a grid with thirty levels of offense 
severity, but quickly abandoned the proposal when the 
commission recognized that sentencing judges would be 
fundamentally alienated from guidelines that were not 
intuitively plausible on their face. A “just” sentence that 
could be determined only after plugging a series of vari-
ables into an algorithm (effectively what the federal 
guidelines do) is not only not intuitively plausible, it is 
alienating.
The mechanical, non-intuitive, arbitrary character of 
the Commission’s “mandatory” guidelines is a principal 
reason why most judges in the guidelines’ early years 
hated them. Some judges appointed after the decision in 
Mistretta had no experience of anything else and appear to 
have accepted them as a fact of federal judicial life. How-
ever, the high levels of support for the post-Booker advisory 
guidelines among district court judges that Judge Saris 
noted makes it clear that, given a choice, most sentencing 
judges prefer the current regime.
The second important lesson not learned from the 
states is that judges and other courtroom participants 
believe that just sentences should be individualized to 
take account of the offender’s situation and circum-
stances. A vast literature on mandatory minimum 
sentences, going back centuries, shows that judges, law-
yers, and juries often circumvent their imposition if they 
require punishments more severe than courtroom actors 
believe to be just.14 Prosecutors have inherent and unre-
viewable power to use their charging and bargaining 
decisions to avoid application of guidelines they consider 
unjustly severe. Judges have to be more covert in their 
efforts to avoid imposing sentences they believe to be 
unjust, but they often do exactly that, frequently in com-
plicity with counsel. Some legislators may fume about 
“frustration of the legislative will,” but that’s how it 
always has been and likely always will be. As anyone 
familiar with the federal guidelines system knows, it was 
not only judges and defense counsel who wanted to—
and did—avoid imposing unduly severe punishments 
called for by mandatory minimums and “mandatory” 
sentencing guidelines. Prosecutors were willing accom-
plices, as U.S. Sentencing Commission–sponsored 
research showed.15
The third important lesson concerned the basic struc-
ture of guidelines. No state tried to micro-manage 
sentencing. Guidelines that existed in the states when the 
Commission did its original drafting were simple. They 
were typically set out in a grid, dividing offenses into six to 
ten seriousness categories, creating four to six criminal 
history categories, and setting out non-exclusive lists of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. No state tried 
to incorporate details about use or presence of weapons, 
injuries, detailed property loss values, or role in the 
offense explicitly into the guideline calculations except to 
the extent that such details were statutory offense ele-
ments. Otherwise they were to be considered case by case.
State guidelines were simple because state commis-
sions recognized that sentencing raises complicated 
issues, that offense circumstances and offender character-
istics vary significantly among cases, that plea bargaining 
counsel have enormous influence over sentencing out-
comes, and that judges want to impose sentences that are 
just and appropriate.
The aim of the state systems was to provide starting 
points. Counsel could be expected to bargain in the 
shadow of the guidelines, with most cases therefore result-
ing in sentences less severe than if they had been fully 
prosecuted and sentenced under the guidelines. In cases 
not resolved through negotiations, judges could be 
expected to start thinking about sentencing by looking at 
the appropriate guidelines range, but then adjusting 
upward or downward to take account of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. State experience showed that 
judges much more often depart downward than upward.
If the U.S. Sentencing Commission had paid attention 
to the state experience on these three crucial points, and 
many lesser ones, the guidelines would have looked very 
different, been resisted less vigorously, and been circum-
vented less often.
II. a Better Mousetrap
For mostly ill, the initial members of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission adopted overly complex, overly detailed, 
“mandatory” guidelines. Fixing them eventually required a 
series of sometimes tortured U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions. In the end, the system is not so bad, for two reasons.
First, to a large extent it addresses the greatest injustices 
in sentencing—aberrantly harsh, disproportionately severe 
punishments. By allowing sentencing judges substantial 
discretion to impose less severe sentences than the notori-
ously harsh federal guidelines specify, the current system 
allows judges in many more cases than before Booker to 
ameliorate what would otherwise be unduly harsh punish-
ments. The current system does not do as well concerning 
unduly harsh sentences attributable to idiosyncratic deci-
sion making by individual judges. Sentence appeals are, of 
course, available, but that is not foolproof. No doubt some 
poor souls languish in prison for vastly longer than can be 
justified. The partial solace under the post-Booker system is 
that fewer people suffer that fate. In a better world, parole 
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must be closely proportioned to the severity of the crime. 
Immanuel Kant, the prototypical retributive theorist, 
believed that punishments must be closely proportioned 
to the offender’s blameworthiness. Each, however, 
believed that punishments more severe than his calculus 
would permit were fundamentally unjust.
Similar ideas are expressed and supported in our time. 
The second edition of the Model Penal Code, for example, 
endorses “limiting retributivism,” the idea that offenders 
may sometimes, perhaps often, be punished less than they 
release or its equivalent would be available to deal quietly 
and more humanely with such cases.
From the beginning of sustained efforts in the eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries to think about just 
punishment, nearly all normative theorists have agreed 
that disproportionately severe punishments are funda-
mentally unjust. Jeremy Bentham, the prototypical 
utilitarian (now we say “consequentialist”) punishment 
theorist, believed that punishment can be justified only by 
its good effects, and that to be an effective deterrent, it 
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
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between sentences imposed in different courts in a conti-
nent-wide country. It is equally unrealistic to imagine 
eliminating or dramatically diminishing disparities within 
a single state. Every state sentencing commission that sur-
veyed state sentencing patterns as part of its work learned 
that there are significant differences among rural, subur-
ban, and urban sentencing patterns, and often learned that 
communities of the same size in different parts of a state 
have distinctive sentencing patterns. There is nothing sur-
prising about that. Local judges, prosecutors, defense 
counsel, and probation officers almost always come from 
the communities in which they work and inevitably more 
or less strongly share the cultural norms and moral beliefs 
prevalent in their communities. These differ widely within 
a state, and it would be astonishing if they did not influ-
ence sentencing patterns. They do—markedly.
What’s true of a single state in the nature of things is 
true in a country well known to be characterized by major 
regional differences in cultural tradition and political 
belief. It would be astonishing if cultural attitudes toward 
crime and punishment were the same in Oklahoma, Mon-
tana, and Maine, or in “Red” and “Blue” states generally. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission, in its research on past 
sentencing practices, like every other sentencing commis-
sion, learned that there were major differences in 
sentencing patterns in different district courts, and either 
naïvely or in willful denial acted as if guidelines can sub-
stantially alleviate them.
It’s not true that guidelines can substantially reduce dis-
parities across an entire continent, as Figures 1–3 (and the 
accompanying tables presenting data numerically) show. 
The figures show within-range sentences, substantial assis-
tance departures, aggravated departures, and mitigated 
deserve but never more. In much of Northern Europe, the 
prevailing theory is “asymmetric proportionality,” which 
expresses much the same ideas: punishments should 
never be more severe than is deserved but may be made 
less severe to take account of the offenders’ characteristics 
and circumstances.16 Most civil law countries in Europe 
have tight statutory limits on the maximum severity of 
sentences in individual cases and strong doctrinal princi-
ples requiring that punishments be apportioned to the 
offender’s wrongdoing.
As a practical matter (see Figures 1–3), judges very sel-
dom impose sentences more severe than the upper limit 
of a guideline range. That’s not the same as the absolute 
bars envisaged by limiting retributivism or asymmetric 
proportionality, but it shows that in practice sentences 
above the upper limit are uncommon.
Second, judges by themselves and in concert usually 
with prosecutors and defense lawyers, can take account of 
offenders’ situations and circumstances in ways they 
believe to be just and appropriate. In the pre-1987 federal 
indeterminate sentencing system, the absence of upper 
limits short of statutory maxima invited idiosyncratically 
and aberrantly severe punishments. After 1987, federal 
law retained the exceedingly long statutory maxima cre-
ated for an indeterminate sentencing system in which the 
parole board set actual release dates, which made the stat-
utory maxima almost irrelevant. In the post-Booker federal 
sentencing system, the risks of disproportionately severe 
punishments are much reduced.
III. The limits of the Possible
It is unrealistic verging on naïve to imagine than any sen-
tencing system can substantially eliminate disparities 
Figure 3.
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1991 and remained much less common than elsewhere in 
2000 and 2010. Departures were common in Arizona and 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1990 and remained 
common in 2000 and 2010. In these two districts even the 
prevalent forms of departure remained the same over 
twenty years—self-initiated downward departures by judges 
in Arizona and downward departures following substantial 
assistance motions in Pennsylvania.
Each of the six districts is in recognizably the same 
place in 1991, 2000, and 2010 relative to the others and 
carries on its own distinctive practices. No system of fed-
eral guidelines is going to produce similar sentencing 
patterns in Arizona, Maine, Louisiana, and Philadelphia.
From that perspective, that 80 percent of federal sen-
tences nationally fall within ranges or result from 
substantial assistance motions is little short of remarkable. 
If revised guidelines achieve seemingly higher levels of 
compliance, it will only be because new methods of cir-
cumvention have developed.
departures in six federal district courts in 1991, 2000, and 
2010. Two of the districts were selected because they had 
especially low departure rates in 1991, two because they 
had especially high departure rates, and two because their 
departure rates reflected national means.
There were dramatic differences in formal guidelines 
compliance in 1991 in terms of percentages of cases falling 
within guidelines ranges—above 95 percent in two districts, 
around 80 percent in two districts, and just above 50 percent 
in two districts. Among the districts with lower compliance 
rates, there were major differences in the roles played by sub-
stantial assistance motions and other mitigated departures.
Those patterns repeat in 2000 and 2010—both in dis-
tricts that have distinctive levels of within-range sentences 
(especially when within-range and substantial assistance 
sentences are combined) and between districts in which 
substantial assistance motions are common and those in 
which mitigated departures are common. Departures of any 
kind were uncommon in the eastern district of Virginia in 
Table 1 
1991 Sentencing by Guidelines Compliance, Six U.S. District Courts
1991 Within Range Upward Departure
Substantial Assistance 
Departure
Other Downward  
Departure
E.D. Oklahoma 96.8 0 0 3.2
E.D. Virginia 94.5 1.1 3.1 1.3
Maryland 80.6 0.8 14.3 4.2
M.D. North Carolina 80.3 1.0 15.8 2.9
Arizona 55.7 1.4 10.9 32.0
E.D. Pennsylvania 54.0 1.0 41.0 4.0
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1991 Annual Report (available in hard copy only).
Table 2 
2000 Sentencing by Guidelines Compliance, Six U.S. District Courts
2000 Within Range Upward Departure
Substantial Assistance 
Departure
Other Downward  
Departure
E.D. Oklahoma 67.7 0 3.1 29.2
E.D. Virginia 89.0 0.1 7.4 3.5
Maryland 57.7 0.8 28.2 13.3
M.D. North Carolina 81.2 2.0 13.9 30.0
Arizona 28.6 0.6 7.2 63.5
E.D. Pennsylvania 52.2 1.1 36.6 10.2
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Office of Policy Analysis, 2000 Datafile, OPAFY00, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
index.cfm.
Table 3 
2010 Sentencing by Guidelines Compliance, Six U.S. District Courts
2010 Within Range Upward Departure
Substantial Assistance 
Departure
Other Downward  
Departure
E.D. Oklahoma 63.7 0.9 22.1 13.3
E.D. Virginia 73.7 1.9 4.1 20.3
Maryland 46.2 4.0 22.3 27.3
M.D. North Carolina 73.2 2.9 10.9 13.0
Arizona 43.5 1.3 2.8 52.3
E.D. Pennsylvania 37.3 0.8 32.0 29.8
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Office of Policy Analysis, 2010 Datafile, OPAFY10, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
index.cfm.
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 4 i write “line” prosecutors advisedly. there is little doubt that 
senior prosecutors as a policy matter, and many, possibly 
most, prosecutors in theory, favor harsh sentencing laws and 
mandatory minimums because they provide leverage for plea 
negotiations. However, both the long history of  experience with 
mandatory minimums and the literature on courtroom cultures 
make clear that many or possibly most prosecutors handling 
individual cases want sentences to be just and appropriate. 
judge Saris pointed out in her testimony that of  all sentenced 
defendants in FY 2010, “25.4 percent received a government 
sponsored below range sentence.” Saris, supra note 1.
 5 Mistretta v. united States, 488 u.S. 361 (1989).
 6 Marvin Frankel, CriMinal S entenCeS :  law without order (1973).
 7 For details, see andrew von Hirsch, “Federal Sentencing 
guidelines: the united States and canadian Schemes com-
pared,” occasional papers from the center for research in 
crime and justice, no. 4, new York university law School 
(1988); MiChael tonry, S entenCing MatterS  83–89  (1996); 
and kate  S t ith & J oSé  CabraneS , Fear  oF J udging: S entenCing 
guidelineS  in the  Federal CourtS  (1998).
 8 552 u.S. 85 (2007).
 9 See Saris, supra note 1.
 10 Michael tonry, Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven 
Easy Steps, 4 Fed. S ent’g r ep . 355 (1992).
 11 alfred Blumstein, jacqueline cohen, Susan Martin, & Michael 
tonry, eds., Research on Sentencing: The Search for Reform, 
report of  the national academy of  Sciences panel on Sen-
tencing research (1983).
 12 Id.; tonry, supra note 7, at chs. 2 and 3.
 13 See Blumstein et al., supra note 11, at 146. the naS panel 
summarizes the earliest research. i summarized the evidence 
available when the commission was developing its initial 
guidelines in MiChael tonry,  S entenCing r eForM iMpaCtS  (1987).
 14 Michael tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of  Mandatory 
Penalties: Two Centuries of  Consistent Findings, 38 Cr iMe  & 
J uSt.: r ev.  r eS . 65 , Michael tonry ed. (2009).
 15 See, e.g., u.S .  S entenCing CoMMiSS ion,  Mandatory MiniMuM p enal-
tieS  in the Federal CriMinal JuStiCe S ySteM (1991); Stephen j. 
Schulhofer & ilene nagel, A Tale of  Three Cities: An Empirical 
Study of  Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 66 S .  Cal.  l.  r ev. 501 (1992); ilene nagel & 
Stephen j. Schulhofer, Plea Negotiations under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in 
the post-Mistretta Period, 91 nw. u.  l.  r ev.  1284 (1997).
 16 tapio lappi-Seppälä, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: 
The Decline of  the Repressive Ideal, in puniShMent and p enal 
S yS teMS  in weStern Countr ieS  92 (Michael tonry & richard 
Frase eds., 2001).
That current federal sentencing policies and practices 
are probably the best possible in our time does not, of 
course, mean they could not be made better in some other 
time. There is something odd about celebrating 80 per-
cent “compliance” with guidelines in which 25 percent of 
the total represents “government-approved” downward 
departures. In any other developed country the idea that 
prosecutors have authority to “permit” judges to depart by 
filing motions would be seen as prima facie wrong. Judges, 
not prosecutors, are supposed to sentence offenders. Like-
wise in most developed countries, it would be prima facie 
wrong to take account at sentencing of an offender’s assis-
tance in the prosecution of other defendants. In the 
federal system in our time, however, prosecutors have 
been given that power, and the motions do liberate the 
judge to impose a non-guideline sentence he or she con-
siders appropriate.
In a different political climate, a new sentencing com-
mission could start over and develop a system of 
presumptive sentencing guidelines that honors Blakely’s 
strictures on above-guideline sentences and provides 
meaningful guidance to judges without handcuffs. Such 
guidelines have worked well in Minnesota and elsewhere, 
reducing racial and other unwarranted disparities, improv-
ing consistency by allowing counsel to bargain in the 
shadows of the guidelines, and making use of correctional 
resources predictable and thus controllable. An entirely 
new and better system of federal guidelines is not, alas, 
achievable in the current political climate.
Notes
 * an earlier version of  this writing was prepared as a Summary 
of  testimony presented to the u.S. Sentencing commission at 
the “public Hearing on Federal Sentencing options after 
Booker” in Washington, d.c., on February 16, 2012.
 1 judge patti B. Saris, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
crime, terrorism, and Homeland Security, House judiciary 
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